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A PROCEDURE FOR NONPARTISAN DISTRICTING:
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER TECHNIQUES
JAMES B. WEAVERt and SIDNEY W. H:SSft
IN the landmark case of Baker v. Carr I the Supreme Court held that fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of state legislative
apportionments. The Court left many questions unresolved, most significantly
what constitute appropriate standards for testing the constitutionality of ap-
portionment and districting.2 Sundry standards have since been suggested,
ranging from equality of population 3 to the broad requirement that an appor-
tionment and districting be rational-a consistent application of an intelligible
policy.4 But Baker v. Carr left unresolved another, less discussed issue, equally
unsettled and increasingly important. Once having decided that a particular
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1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. It appears that the Court will examine the question of appropriate standards dur-
ing the current term. A number of cases involving both congressional and legislative
apportionment have been appealed. Some of these cases have already been argued. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1963, p. 1, col. 5 (city ed.) ; and N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1963, p. 29,
col. 4 (city ed.). Others have been set down for argument. See 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3110
(Oct. 1, 1963). Several recently appealed cases have not yet been acted upon or set down
for argument. Ibid.
3. See, e.g., Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart,
207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Hanson, Courts in the Thicket: The Problems of
Judicial Standards in Apportionment Cases, 12 Am. U.L. lEv. 51 (1963) ; American Civil
Liberties Union Weekly Bulletin, Mar. 20, 1961, pp. 1-2.
4. See, e.g., Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire:
The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 107 (1962) ; Bickel, The Durability of
Colegrove v. Green, 72 YLE L.J. 39 (1962).
For other approaches to the troublesome problem of constitutional standards for appor-
tionment, see Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of
Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963); McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Tern, Fore-
word: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 54 (1962) ; Emerson, Malapportion-
ment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64 (1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in
Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 252; Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Fed-
eral Constitution, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962) ; McKay, Political Thickets and
Crazy Quilts, 61 Mica. L. REv. 645 (1963).
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representation scheme is unconstitutional, courts must determine how to ad-
minister relief. Courts and commentators have agreed nearly unanimously that
courts ought initially to refrain from granting direct relief and allow the state
legislature another opportunity to reapportion in accord with the federal con-
stitution.5 Should such a response not be forthcoming, however, a court may
be forced to grant direct relief. Again, a whole range of solutions may be open
to the court. 6 This paper concerns one alternative, affirmative judicial appor-
tionment and districting.
7
5. See, e.g., Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963); Mann v. Davis, 213
F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962) ; Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments:
A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE. L.J. 968, 1033-35 (1962).
6. For cases in which courts have been disposed to grant direct relief, at least in the
absence of legislative response, see Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962) ;
Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), execution stayed pending appeal,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 1018 (July 31, 1962).
Elections at large are a commonly mentioned form of direct relief. Indeed, it was this
form of relief which appealed most to pre-Baker v. Carr commentators. See, e.g., Lewis,
Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAv. L. Rxv. 1057, 1087-90 (1958).
Since Baker v. Carr, it has been applied by some courts. See, e.g., Scholle v. Hare, supra;
Mann v. Davis, supra note 5 (execution stayed by the district court pending appeal). The
chief advantage of this form of relief is the tremendous incentive it would afford to
legislators, whose political careers would be at stake in an election at large, to reappor-
tion the state themselves. Moreover, an election at large, if it did occur, would result in
a perfect application of the equal population principle applied to the entire state.
Yet there are reasons why a court might reject this form of direct relief and instead
actively reapportion a state. Should the incentive for legislators to reapportion themselves
be insufficient and consequently an election at large actually be held, there would be nearly
insurmountable problems of administration, such as the printing of ballots with as many
as one hundred candidates for each party. Moreover, a legislature elected at large would
not conform to our usual notions of representation. See Black, Inequities in Districting
for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 15 (1962). Many
other problems might arise. See Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments:
A Problem of Standards, 72 YAL L.J. 968, 1037-38 (1962).
7. While reference will be made throughout to judicial apportionment, the proposal
made in this paper could be utilized by legislatures as well as courts.
There are two approaches which affirmative judicial apportionment can take. That
advocated by Mr. Justice Clark in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259-61 (1962), is to im-
prove somewhat the existing unconstitutional apportionment and districting by eliminating
some of the grossest disparities, while generally adhering to the existing district lines.
The theory of this approach is that the resulting improvement in the apportionment and
districting, together with the threat that the court will more thoroughly apportion, and
district the next time, will be sufficient to "break the stranglehold" of the minority areas
in the legislature and after the next election to enable that body to apportion and district
equitably. See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
The other approach to active judicial reapportionment, and that with which this
article is concerned, requires the court to reapportion the state without regard to existing
district lines. This approach has the advantage not only of awarding underrepresented
citizens prompt relief but also of ending the litigation, which by this time will usually
have dragged on for an extended period of time.
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Since redistricting usually affects the political balance of a legislature, a court
undertaking affirmative apportionment and districting is likely to become the
subject of highly partisan appeals and criticism. Such criticism may create
the appearance that the court is acting from political motivation with the
desire of benefiting a particular partisan interest.8 To avoid this "political
thicket,"9 a court may desire to limit its own discretion in creating new legis-
lative districts. One means of accomplishing this end could be to adopt a
mechanical formula which makes the actual drafting of district lines non-dis-
cretionary once general principles of representation have been determined. It
is at -the stage of drafting district lines, after all, that the decisions having the
most immediate political impact must be made-for example, when deciding
whether a particular precinct should be included within district A or district
B. If a court decided on this course, it might attempt it by basing its appor-
tionment and districting on the principles of equal population and contiguous-
ness-that is, territorial continuity.'0 Even when following these two prin-
ciples, however, district lines can be drawn in many ways, each with different
political repercussions." Courts, therefore, may seek additional principles
which when combined with contiguity and equal population more sharply limit
judicial discretion in drawing district lines.
Legislatures also might find it useful to adopt a procedure which limits
discretion in drawing district lines. Because of the volatile side-effects of al-
ternative redistricting proposals, legislatures are frequently unable to adopt
any representation scheme. Deadlocked legislatures might break the political
impasse if agreement could be reached on a districting procedure which divorces
the results reached from the claims of partisan interests.
Compactness is potentially a principle which, when combined with con-
tiguity and equal population, could produce a non-discretionary districting pro-
cedure. Although the value of using compactness as a guiding principle has
frequently been suggested, 12 no precise definition of the term has been gen-
8. Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962),
is an example of an apportionment case in which the court became embroiled in a partisan
debate and the subject of partisan attack. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 20, 1962, p. 19,
col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 4, 1962, p. 7, col. 1.
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
10. A contiguous legislative district is one in which it is possible to travel between
any two locations within it without leaving the district. The presence or absence of con-
tiguity can be determined simply by glancing at a district map. There is no concept of
"best" contiguity.
11. See Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove
v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 15-16 (1962). There is a vast literature on the interaction of
politics and districting and the problem of the gerrymander, a deliberate manipulation of
districting to maximize a partisan advantage. See, e.g., JEwELL, POLITIcS OF REAPPORT ION-
MENT 14-17, 27 (1962); GRIFFITH, THE RisE AN DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER
(1907) ; ScHMEcEBiER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT ch. IX (1941) ; note 31 iffra.
12. Statutory requirements of contiguity and population equality in congressional dis-
tricting were introduced by Congress in 1842. 5 Stat. 491 (1842). The requirement of
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erally accepted. Usually compactness has been conceived as solely a geographic
relationship, which might be mathematically expressed as requiring the maxi-
mization of the ratio of a district's area to its perimeter. 13 If this were the
definition, the most compact district would be a circle, since it is in that figure
that the maximum area within a given perimeter can be enclosed.' 4 Although
compactness, while not defined, was added by the Reapportionment Act of 1901, 31 Stat.
734 (1901). This tripartite requirement (contiguity, compactness and population equality)
was repeated in the Act of 1911, 37 Stat. 13 (1911), but was dropped in subsequent enact-
ments. The current law is found at 46 Stat. 26 (1929), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
See generally Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932); Celler, Congressional Apportion-
ment-Past, Present, and Future, 17 LAW & CONTE1P. PROB. 268 (1952).
Representative Celler has sought in the past to have the three requirements re-enacted
into law. H.R. 73, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 22(c) (1959) would have required congressional
districts to be drawn up in "as compact form as practicable." See Hearings Before Sub-
committee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10,
at 22-23 (1959) ; Celler, supra at 274.
Despite Congress' omission of the requirement of compactness, as well as those of
contiguity and population equality, most state constitutions maintain these three require-
ments for state legislative districting. EDWARDS, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
627-35 (1959). Political scientists have also recommended that compactness be a require-
ment of districting. See, e.g., Roeck, Meamring Compactness as a Requirement of Legis-
lative Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. Sc. 70 (1961) ; Vickery, On the Prevention
of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. ScI. Q. 105 (1961) ; Krastin, The Implementation of Repre-
sentative Government in a Democracy, 48 IowA L. Rav. 549, 570-72 (1963).
13. There have been few rigorous attempts to define "compactness"; in 1959, for in-
stance, Congressmen seemed unable to explain what the term meant. Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 12, at 22-23.
Where definitions have been given, however, they have usually been of the geographic
nature referred to in the text. See, e.g., Roeck, supra note 12; Vickery, supra note 12.
Cf. Krastin, The Implementation of Representative Government in a Democracy, supra
note 12, at 570-72. See also Professor Kallenbach's suggestion, the ratio of east-west
measurement to north-south measurement, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, supra at 64.
An interesting attempt to give different content to the term "compactness" has been
made by Representative Celler:
As to the requirement of compactness, such elements as economic and social in-
terests of an area, its topography, means of transportation, the desires of the in-
habitants as well as their elected representatives and finally the political factors
should all be considered.
Celler, supra note 12, at 274. Representative Celler conceded to the state legislatures the
task of pouring content into this political definition. Ibid.
14. A circle of one-mile perimeter encloses 1/4pi = 0.0795 square miles. Regular
hexagons, all of the same perimeter, would provide the highest area per unit of perimeter
for geographical shapes that fit together in unlimited number. A regular hexagon of one-
mile perimeter encloses 0.0722 square miles. Similar figures for a square and a triangle
are 0.0625 square miles and 0.0621 square miles respectively.
One commentator has proposed a measure taking advantage of the circle's compact-
ness. He would test the compactness of a legislative district by comparing the area, of
the district to the area of the smallest circle completely circumscribing the district. Roeck,
supra note 12.
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this definition is useful for comparison of already formulated districting plans,
further study would be needed to determine whether it could be adapted to a
procedure for creating districting proposals which are as compact as is pos-
sible consistent with other desired goals, such as contiguity and equal popula-
tion.
As defined in this article, compactness is not solely a geographic measure.
Because we are attempting to reflect at least to some extent popular inter-
ests 'r in districting and because population patterns may coincide with inter-
est patterns, the principle of compactness is here defined as a measure of
population as well as geographic concentration. 6 Under this definition a dis-
trict's boundaries will not necessarily approach a circle as a limit as greater
compactness is achieved. But constructing districts using this compactness
definition will tend to locate districts of maximum compactness around centers
of population, whereas, under prior definitions, "compact" districts would as
likely divide population centers as respect them. And the expanded definition
tends to favor districts coincident with communities of economic or other in-
terests, insofar as these interests coincide with areas of high and low popula-
tion densities.17 Granted, comparison of districting plans by the proffered defini-
tion will require the use of more complex mathematical techniques than where
only geography is considered. But use of this definition is fortunate in more
than its tendency to favor interest-oriented plans; ready-made computer pro-
grams can be adapted to permit creation as well as comparison of districting
plans based upon it.
Apportionment and Districting Procedures
Before courts or legislatures can draw district lines, certain decisions must
be made.'8 The first of these, normally made in the state constitution, is the
15. The argument has been made that in our pluralistic society, a legislative body
should reflect its various constituent communities-that districts should be drawn to en-
compass one particular "community" so as to reflect its interest in the legislature. See
de Grazia, General Theory of Apportionment, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 256 (1952).
Some of this "reflective" philosophy is apparent in Representative Celler's statement,
=spra note 12, with its emphasis on social and economic factors, and in Wright v. Rocke-
feller, 211 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where New York created a Manhattan
congressional district that was nearly 100% Negro and Puerto Rican in population. Of
course, it may be impossible to represent all possible diverse social interest groups and
still adhere to the equal population principle, and attempts to account for such constitu-
encies involve the courts to some degree in political matters.
16. Technically, the definition of compactness proposed here is a mathematical one,
based on the moment of inertia principle. For this definition, see notes 3440 infra and
accompanying text.
17. For a more complete discussion of this phenomenon, see paragraph immediately
preceding text accompanying note 40 infra.
18. These decisions can be made in one or more ways. Usually, some, if not all, will
be made in the state constitution. Without a constitutional amendment, a legislature could
not alter those decisions. Nor could a court, unless it found the state constitutional pro-
visions violated the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. Some or all of these
[Vol. 72: 288)
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number of legislative houses.19 Next, the number of legislators in each house
must be determined. Where this number is not fixed in the constitution, even
a court might change it during apportionment and districting.20 Perhaps most
crucial is the decision as to principles of representation for each legislative
house. If population, the most frequently mentioned principle, is adopted, then
several population measurements are available: total population, population of
voting age, population excluding aliens, or registered or actual voters. The
choice among these population measures can have a considerable effect on the
final pattern of representation. 21 In this article total population is assumed to
be the appropriate population measure. Non-population principles of repre-
sentation have also been used. Thus, area has been adopted by some states,
as have such principles as community of economic or other interests.22 The
districting proposal as made in this paper assumes a choice of population
equality, compactness, and contiguity as the only principles for representation,
although modifications could probably be made to accommodate other prin-
ciples.
decisions may be made by general statute or long-accepted practice. A legislature could
then amend those statutes or ignore the practices while apportioning and districting. But
a court, if it were apportioning, would probably feel constrained to apply the general
statute, if not the consistent past practice, assuming neither violates the federal constitu-
tion.
19. All states have two houses except Nebraska, which has one. 12 BooK OF THE
STATES 29 (1958).
20. Only in Virginia and Washington is the number of legislators established by the
legislature entirely apart from the constitution. In Maine and Rhode Island, however, the
number of senators is set by a sliding scale based on population, as is the number of
representatives in Connecticut. Many constitutions specify only ranges, minimum or maxi-
mum numbers, for one or both houses, or a ratio between, the numbers in the houses.
See NATIONAL MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUa ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
(1962).
Where a formula for determining the number of members is found to violate the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, a court might choose a number
of members differing from that derived from that formula. Such a situation would have
faced the federal district court in WMCA v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
had it found unconstitutional the challenged provision of the New York Constitution a
complicated formula for determining the number of senate seats. See N.Y. CoNsT. art. 3,
§ 4.
21. See Silva, The Population Base for Apportionment of the New York Legis-
lature, 32 FORDHAm L. REv. 1 (1963); Committee of 39, Wilmington, Del., Notes and
Statistics on Overlay Maps, pp. 1-2 (mimeographed materials). Two legislative houses
could retain some difference in bases, and retain population as the primary principle of
representation, if one house were based on total population and the other on, say, actual
voters. See Silva, Legislative Representation--With Special Reference to New York, 27
LAW & CONTEM. PRoB. 408, 409-14 (1962).
22. Michigan recently has amended its constitutions to recognize explicitly the prin-
ciple of area. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1963, p. 24, col. 3. And in Wright v. Rockefeller, 211
F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the district court seemed to give credence to an
argument upholding Manhattan's congressional districting on a "community" theory. See
also note 15 supra.
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Once principles of representation have been chosen it must be determined
whether to respect boundaries of existing political units, such as cities or
counties, in subsequent districting. If any such units are recognized, a number
of legislators is then "apportioned" to each, using pre-established formulae re-
flecting some of the principles of representation adopted.2m Such boundaries
immediately restrict the population equality achievable through later district-
ing and therefore may violate a constitutional standard of equal population,
should one be adopted.2 For example, even in tiny Delaware, which has but
three counties, the apportionment of the thirty-five representatives among
these counties on a population basis results in a minimum deviation between
the counties of seven per cent in population-per-representative. 25
23. Congress, for example, distributes representatives amongst states, in accordance
with the principle of equal proportions, an adaptation of the equal population principle.
New York uses a more complex formula recognizing pre-existing political units, in this
case, counties. See Silva, Apportionment in New York, 30 FORDHAm L. Rrv. 581, 595-
650 (1962). See note 55 infra.
In its technical sense, apportionment refers to the allocation of legislative seats among
pre-defined units. Districting, on the other hand, is the process of drawing the geographic
boundaries within those pre-defined units. Thus, Congress "apportions" representatives
among the states while the states "district" by drawing congressional district lines.
24. For this reason the American Political Science Association recommends against
recognition of such units. See ZELLER, AuMERCAN STATE LEGISLATURES 46 (1954).
25. Since there are 35 representatives in the Delaware House, the ideal population
for a legislative district in 1960 was 446,292 + 35 = 12,751. But no solution giving effect
to the county lines (i.e., by requiring every district to be wholly within one county) could
avoid an average population deviation per district of 7% (from the average in Kent to
the average in Sussex):
No. of
Reps. (to Pop. -
Popu- Pop. + closest No. of % Deviation
Area lation 12,751 onte-half) Reps. from 12,751
New Castle Co. 307,446 24.1 24 12,810 -0.5%
Kent County 65,651 5.2 5 13,112 -2.8%
Sussex County 73,195 5.7 6 12,199 +4.3%
Total Delaware 446,292 35.0 12,751
In fact, it is remarkable that these county populations, divided by 12,751, come even this
close to assigning whole representatives to one county or the other.
The next important boundary in Delaware is the major city of Wilmington, which is
within New Castle County. However, the same calculation indicates that a major devia-
tion in population, must be encountered unless one representative is assigned half to Wil-
mington, half to the remainder of New Castle County.
Wilmington 95,827 7.5 7 @ 7 reps. 13,690 +7.4%
@ 8 reps. 11,978 -7.1%
Other New
Castle Co. 211,619 16.6 16 @ 17 reps. 12,448 -2.4%
@ 16 reps. 13,226 +3.7%
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Acceptable district boundaries within the existing political units must also
be determined so that the full set of inviolate lines is known. These boundaries
might be county, ward or precinct lines, which normally follow such recognized
features as highways, rivers or railroads.2 A legislature, although probably
not a court, could alter county and precinct boundaries while redistricting, if
it so chose. As with the recognition of major political units, such minimum
area restrictions may limit achievement of population equality. And since
census data is usually not collected for smaller political units, such as election
districts and precincts,2 7 such restrictions may also make approximations
necessary in estimating the degree of population equality.28
The final step in this process, to be dealt with at length in this paper, is the
actual drawing of district lines. In the past, principles of representation chosen
by legislatures have not significantly limited their freedom to do almost what-
ever they wished.2 9 Exercising the available option, legislatures have generally
Since the county would be allocated only 24 representatives (7 + 17 or 8 + 16), based
on 1960 population, either the city or the rest of the county must accept under-represen-
tation or both will have to share a representative with the other part of the county. If no
legislator can be shared between Wilmington and New Castle County, a minimum devia-
tion of 10% (7.4 + 2.4 or 7.1 + 3.7) is automatically required within this single county.
Likewise, further improvements are possible if county lines are not observed as the
determining boundaries. The city of Milford (1960 population, 5,795) lies partly in Kent
and partly in Sussex County. By considering the population of Milford entirely with Sus-
sex County for apportionment purposes, the deviation between the two counties could be
reduced below 2%.
Pop. - Deviation
Pop. + No. of No. of From
Population 12,751 Reps. Reps. 12,751
Kent less Milford
(Part) 63,403 4.97 5 12,681 -0.6%
Sussex incl. all
Milford 75,443 5.91 6 12,574 -1.4%
26. For example, the amendment to the Delaware Constitution approved January,
1963, and declared unconstitutional in Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963),
contained the following provision: "Each new Representative District shall, insofar as is
possible, be formed of contiguous territory; shall be as nearly equal in population as pos-
sible to the other new districts being created within the existing Representative District;
shall be bounded by ancient boundaries, major roads, streams, or other natural boundaries;
and not be so created as to unduly favor any person or political party" (Section, 5, in
part, modifying Section 2A of the Constitution). In Delaware, several election districts
are now merely lines on a map (as are most state boundaries) which do not coincide with
the streets and communities developed since the election districts were first established.
27. UNITM STATES BUREAu OF THE CENsuS, THE DEFINTIoN op CENSUS ENUmERA-
TION DIsTRIcTs By LocAL AUTHORITIES 2 (rev. ed., 1959) recognizes only the following
political boundaries: congressional districts, counties, all incorporated communities, wards,
and certain unincorporated communities. See also notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
28. If actual or registered voters were used as the basis of representation rather than
total population, an exact count would be available.
29. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
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districted on a partisan basis, often with the goal of re-electing as many in-
cumbents as possible. While population, registratioil and voting data have been
used to some extent, political goals are most frequently served. 30 Gerrymander-
ing 31 remains a frequent complaint.
But courts and legislatures may in certain circumstances regard the making
of such political judgments as undesirable when actually drafting district
lines.32 The proposal which follows assumes courts and legislatures have chosen
contiguity, population equality and compactness as guiding principles before
the districting stage is reached and have also decided to minimize the discre-
tion exercised during districting itself. Application of this procedure creates
alternative proposals and permits direct comparison of those and other pro-
posals for adherence to these three principles. This comparison permits im-
mediate rejection of proposals deviating more than others as to both popula-
tion equality and maximum compactness, or deviating excessively in relation
to one of those principles. Nevertheless, there may be several proposals not
excludable by that test, and some discretion may be necessary to choose among
those remaining.33
Development of a Compactness Measure
Consider the data points plotted as circles in Figure 1. On the graph, X might
represent passage of time and Y population during consecutive periods. What
is illustrated here is a common statistical problem. If there is some reason to
believe a straight line will best fit a series of data points, one can take a
straight edge and move it through the points to "eyeball" a good line. Better
statistical practice is to utilize the "least-squares" technique.3 4 This technique
30. See JEwELL, PoLITIcs OF REAPPORTIONMENT 14-17, 27 (1962); GlurFrrn, THE
RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 21, 100, 124 (1907). It has been suggested
that the failure of state legislatures to establish equitable representation schemes, and the
socio-economic effects of that failure, were among the chief factors leading to the Court's
decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legis-
lative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968, 979-81 (1963);
Wheeler & Bebout, After Reapportionment, 51 NAT'L Cmvic REv. 246 (1962).
31. Gerrymandering is "the formation of election districts, on another basis than that
of single and homogeneous political units as they existed previous to the ... (redistricting),
with boundaries arranged for partisan. (or factional) advantage." GuirrrH, THE RISE AND
DEVELOPIENT OF THE GEMRYANDER 21 (1907). There are two principal means of gerry-
mandering: (1) distributing the opposition party's vote among a number of districts so
that it is diluted and the opposition can carry few, if any, districts; (2) concentrating
the opposition's vote in a few districts so that it is dissipated in the form of large mar-
gins in these few districts. Districts can be absolutely equal in population and still be
gerrymandered. Id. at 15-21. Nor will a gerrymandered district always be identifiable by
its shape, in spite of the usual connotation of the term.
32. See notes 1-12 supra and accompanying text.
33. This is a methodological outline of the proposal put forth in this article. A more
complete development of this procedure will follow in the subsequent text and notes.
34. CRoxToN & COWDEN, APpIED GENERAL STATISTICS 260-70 (2d ed. 1955) ; EzEz
& Fox, METHoDs OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYsIS 61-63 (3d ed. 1959); KEY,
A PRnmxR OF STATIsTIcs FOR PoLTcAL ScIENTIsTs 78-81 (1959).
[Vol. 72: 288)
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mathematically locates the line which minimizes the sum of the squared dis-
tances 35 from the points to the line (a2 + b2 ± c+ + d 2 + e2).
FiGuRE 1
"LEAsT SguAREs" FIT OF LINE TO DATA
Y
The least-squares line on a graph is analogous to the center of gravity in
a physical body. Both are measures of average location. The former has points
averaged into a line; the latter has weight of the body averaged into a central
point.
The example of the center of gravity in a physical body brings us closer to
a concept immediately relevant to the question of representation than dispersion
about a line.36 In studying the properties of rotating bodies, physicists find
it useful to have a measure of the dispersion of the body's weight about an
axis of rotation. This measure is called the moment of inertia.3 7 The physical
35. The effect of squaring the distance may be clarified by a practical problem in-
volving a least-squares solution. Assume two people live two miles apart, and it is de-
sired to build a road perpendicular to the line between their houses. It is possible to put
the road adjacent to one of the houses or equidistant between them. In either case the
total man-miles from the highway are two: In the former case, one person two miles
away [(1 x 2) + (1 x 0) = 2], and in the latter, two people each one mile away
[ (1 x 1) + (I x 1) = 2]. A decision rule which merely minimizes the total deviation
would be indifferent to the choice. Intuitively, we can argue that the alternative repre-
sented by the latter best distributes man-miles over the whole community, while keeping
the total at a minimum. It would also be the selection under a least-squares criterion,
for the sum of the squared deviations in the former case would be 22 + 02 = 4 while for
the latter, it would be 12 + 12 = 2.
36. Dispersion, or minimum variance, as applied to population equality, has also been
proposed as a single measure of districting. PRAY & MANER, THE: NEw PERSPECrIVE O1
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN OEMAHOMA 27-28 (1962). A districting proposal em-
bodying this procedure was submitted to a referendum in Oklahoma, but was defeated by
a two-to-one margin. Id.
37. The moment of inertia of a mass about an axis of rotation is defined as the
product of the mass and the square of the distance to the axis (the name was first sug-
gested by Euler in 1765). It plays the same role in rotational motion that mass alone does
in linear motion. In linear motion
Force = Mass X Acceleration
and
Kinetic Energy = 1/2 X Mass X (Velocity) 2.
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body consisting of the five points in Figure 1 has a moment of inertia about
the illustrated line equal to (a 2 + b 2 + c 2 + d2 + 0), assuming each point
has a mass of one unit.38
If a body has only two dimensions and an axis of rotation is perpendicular
to its plane, one can talk about the moment of inertia of the body about the
point where the perpendicular axis intersects the plane. For purposes of com-
putation the moment of inertia about that point X is defined as the weight of
the body times the square of the distance from it to X. Thus, in Figure 2, the
moment of inertia of the small shaded square labeled S1 about point X is its
weight W 1 times the distance A1 squared-that is, W 1 A1
2. If the body is
large with respect to the distance (the whole checkerboard in Figure 2, for
example) its moment of inertia is computed for each of the segments of the
body (each small square here) and added together to obtain the entire body's
moment of inertia. This procedure is necessary because the small squares are
different distances from X and may have different "weights" (e.g., W 1, W 2,
W3, •. • W 64). Thus, the moment of inertia about X for the whole checker-
board is (WA 1
2 ± VWT2A22 + W 3A32 + ... ± W 64A642).
FIGuaE 2
For bodies of equal weight but differing distribution of the weight, the
moment of inertia for an axis running through the center of gravity is smallest
when the weight is concentrated at the center, i.e., when the body is compact. 30
In rotational motion
Torque -- Moment of Inertia X Angular Acceleration
and
Kinetic Energy = 1/2 x Moment of Inertia X (Angular Velocity) 2.
That it takes more energy to stop a wveight swirled about by a two foot string than one
of equal weight swirled at an equal number of revolutionrs per minute (angular velocity)
at the end of a one foot string is indicative of the fact that the moment of inertia of the
first string and weight is greater.
38. SF.nS, M cHANIcs, HF.T AND SOUND 202-13 (2d ed. 1958); 1 SHaRTLEY &
Wn.UIA S, PHYsIcs 193-98 (1950) ; WHITE, MODERN" COLLEGE PHYSICS 178-80 (3dl ed.
1956).
39. See authorities cited in note 38 supra.
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To grasp this idea, consider three objects: a bicycle wheel, a flat disk, and a
top. If all have equal weight, the moment of inertia about the vertical axis
through the center of each is least for the compact top, where weight is con-
centrated near the axis, and most for the wheel, where weight is concentrated
at the rim, distant from the center. By the same token the moment of inertia
about an axis of rotation for any particular object will be least if the axis
passes through the body's center of gravity. For example, if the moment of
inertia of the top were measured from a point one foot from the top's center
of gravity, the calculation might give a result about equal to the value for the
wheel calculated about its center of gravity. Thus, in the checkerboard of
Figure 2, assuming the weight is equally distributed throughout, the moment
of inertia is smallest about the checkerboard's center.
Moment of inertia provides a possible measure of compactness in legis-
lative districting, involving both area and population. Assume that the checker-
board in Figure 2 represents one legislative district. By dividing the district
into sixty-four rectangular blocks, it becomes possible to make a calculation
analogous to moment of inertia about any point in the plane of the checker-
board. For each block, this calculation, which hereafter will also be called
moment of inertia, would be the product of the block's population times the
square of the distance between the block and that point. To obtain the moment
of inertia about that point for the entire district, the moments of inertia for
each block are summed. This figure will be smallest when the point about
which the moment of inertia is calculated is the population center of the dis-
trict-that is, the "center of population gravity." In Figure 2, if the people
were distributed equally in each of the blocks, the "center of population
gravity" would be at the center of the checkerboard. On the other hand, if
there were a city in the upper left-hand corner and if the remaining blocks
were sparsely populated, the population center would move from the center of
the board toward that corner.
Now assume that the checkerboard in Figure 2 is to be divided into several
legislative districts of equal population. If there is some concentration of popu-
lation, one or more of these districts can be made relatively "compact"-its
moment of inertia can be made small-by locating the legislative districts so
that their population centers will be near the center of the population concen-
tration. The remaining districts will be larger and have greater moments of
inertia, however. To achieve a balance, and thereby guarantee that all the dis-
tricts are somewhat compact, one could compare the summed moments of
inertia of many different districting plans and choose that which produces the
lowest sum. The compactness of a districting plan would then be defined as
the sum of the moments of inertia of each proposed district about its own
center of population gravity, the most compact plan being the one having the
lowest sum.
Application of this definition of compactness would tend to discourage dis-
tricts of extremely elongated shapes, since the farther a part of the district is
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from the population center of that district, the more it will add to the moment
of inertia. Similarly it would tend to create districts the population centers of
which coincide with areas of high population density, since the closer that high
density area is to the population center of its district, the smaller will be the
distance squared factor by which the population figure will be multiplied, and
consequently the lower will be the moment of inertia. Since it is the sum of
these moments of inertia of each district in the plan which is minimized, these
phenomena are tendencies and not certainties.
Districting By the Compactness Measure
As already described, before districting is begun by this or any other method,
certain choices must be made.4 0 The number of houses, the number of legis-
lators in and the principles of representation for each house, and the larger
political units within which districting will occur must be determined. Finally,
it must be decided what are the minimum units which must be wholly con-
tained in any district. This last decision will both determine and depend upon
the types of boundaries deemed acceptable for the final districts. In the ex-
ample in Figure 2, these minimum units correspond to the sixty-four rectan-
gular blocks. If population equality is a principle of representation, accuracy
dictates that these units be ones for which population figures are available.
Since census figures do not ordinarily provide population counts of precincts
or election districts, these units are not apt for this purpose.4' On the other
hand, if equality of registered or actual voters were a basis of representation,
then precinct or election units could be used.
The smallest unit of population count provided by the United States Census
is the "enumeration district" 42 (hereinafter abbreviated ED), and these have
been chosen as the minimum unit here. This unit has natural boundaries of the
type usually desired for legislative districts (hereinafter abbreviated LD), such
as rivers, highways, or railroads.43 And since ED population averages under
1,000,4 LDs will generally be sufficiently large to permit quite precise equali-
zation of population even though each ED must be wholly contained within
an LD.
40. See notes 18-28 supra and accompanying text.
41. See note 27 supra.
42. An enumeration district is a clearly defined geographic area, to be covered by
one census enumerator during the decennial census. For large cities, population data per
city block is also available. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNrrz STATES
CENSUSES OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1960: PRINCIPAL DATA-COLLECTION FoRms
AND PROCEDURES (1961); UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE DEFINITION OF
CENSUS ENUmERATION DISTRICTS By LOCAL AUTHORITIES (rev. ed. 1959).
Population statistics and maps of the enumeration districts are available for all areas
within the United States, and may be purchased from the Bureau of the Census.
43. See note 26 supra.
44. In Delaware, the state to which the proposed formula will later be applied, the




Other units for which population data is available could also be used. Census
tracts, which consist of several EDs, are readily adaptable to this formula.
Counties could also be used where several counties are to be combined to create
each LD. If larger minimum units are used, however, greater population in-
equalities will be necessitated and, consequently, constitutional standards may
be violated.
Since districting by minimizing moment of inertia involves numerous cal-
culations, application of this procedure by hand would require considerable
time and introduce significant probability of arithmetic error. 45 To overcome
these problems, we have used electronic computers, which very quickly per-
form the necessary calculations by applying an intricate set of logical rules-
the computer "program"-to the data supplied them.46 No available programs
or computer techniques are known which will give a single, best answer to the
districting problem, though such a solution seems possible if enough funds and
efforts are put to the problem, especially considering the rapid advances in
size and sophistication of available computers.
Despite a press of time and dearth of funds, it has still been possible largely
to solve this problem through computers. The chosen measure of compactness
makes it possible to take advantage of certain mathematical similarities between
the redistricting problem and a problem already programmed on computers-
that of assigning customer orders to specific warehouse locations so as to
minimize freight costs. 47 This program, supplemented for this specific use by
various additional steps and subcalculations, assigns EDs (customers) to LD
centers (warehouses) in a manner minimizing moment of inertia (freight
45. Arithmetic error in reapportionment has been regularly troublesome. As early
as 1790 when Thomas Jefferson made hand calculations for legislative apportionment and
districting, several errors were carried over into the original congressional apportionment.
SCHMECKBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT Ch. VIII (1941). A recent opinion
demonstrates similar problems exist today, even in a small state like Delaware:
Upon analysis of plaintiffs' submissions the court has found a number of errors
that illustrate vividly the extreme difficulty of apportioning a State in a mathe-
matically correct and workable fashion.
Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 194 (D. Del. 1963).
Automatic computation minimizes chance of such errors, in spite of many tedious
manipulations required, and permits automatic checks of population totals and other figures
at each stage.
46. For a general description of the operation of computers, see BERKELEY & WAIN-
WRIGHT, CommTRus, TIEm OPERATION AND APPLIcATION (1956); KoznrsEKY, EI.Ec-
TRONIC COMPUTERS AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (1956); CANNING, ELEcTRONIC DATA
PROcEssnG FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY (1956); GRABBE, RAdO & WOOLDRIGE, HAND-
BOOK OF AUTOMATION, COMPUTATION, AND CONTROL, VOL. 2 (1958); STIBrrz & LARRnvEE,
MATHEmATICS Am ComPuTERs (1957).
47. Mathematically, this is the transportation problem of linear programming and
has been solved exactly in many kinds of applications. CHURcHMAN, AcKOFF & ARuOFw,
INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS RESEARcH 279-98 (1957); GARviN, INTRODUCTION TO
LINEAR PROGRAMMING 85-104 (1960).
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cost). This procedure will now be described in detail, followed by an illustra-
tive example. 48
The first step in this procedure is to feed the computer the data to which
it will apply the formula, or "program." Since census data does not establish
the location of individuals within each ED, all people are assumed to be
located at the geographic center of their respective ED's. The centers of all
the EDs within the unit to be districted are then located on a coordinate grid
and the north-south, east-west coordinates of each ED center, along with its
population, are fed into the computer.49 This enables the computer to calculate
the distance between any point and each of the ED centers, and in turn cal-
culate the moment of inertia of the ED about any point. The number of LDs
to be created, and their average population, must also be fed into the computer.
At this point it is necessary to make a set of initial guesses of the population
centers of each LD (warehouse location), and then to feed the coordinates of
those guesses into the computer. The computer assigns each ED (order) to
an LD center in a way that minimizes the sum of the moments of inertia about
the hypothesized centers for the entire unit being districted. A characteristic
of the existing program requires exactly equal population in the LDs; there-
fore, the computer generally will assign parts of one or more EDs to different
LDsY0 To counteract this phenomenon, a supplementary computer program
reunites split EDs so that the entire ED is assigned to the LD having the
largest share of the ED's population. Based on this reassignment of EDs to
LDs, the computer then calculates the population and moment of inertia of
each LD and totals the moment of inertia of the entire unit districted.
Since the assignment of split EDs to one LD will likely alter the population
centers of the LDs affected, the computer is also directed to determine the
actual LD population centers at this time. If the actual population centers of
the LDs are different from the trial centers, the districting cannot be assumed
the same as when districts are assimilated around the calculated centers. Con-
sequently, the calculated centers are now used as new trial population centers
for a new redistricting by the procedure just described. If this results in a
different ED assignment to LDs, the actual population centers of these new
LDs are again calculated and, if they are different from the ones previously
calculated, the entire process is repeated. This procedure is continued until no
change in ED assignment results from use of calculated as opposed to trial
LD centers.
At this point, we have a series of possible districting plans with calculated
population deviations and moments of inertia of each. Comparison of these
48. The following flow chart may be of some assistance in understanding this proce-
dure. Except where indicated by arrows, the procedure flows vertically, step by step,
down the chart. (See facing page, 303.)
49. See note 56 infra. In some areas the available coordinates of the ED centers will
be so similar that it is possible to give only one set of coordinates, using the sum of the
EDs' populations as the weight of the combined district.
50. It may be shown mathematically that the maximum number of EDs split will be





require equal LD population
For each LD, compute moment
of inertia and population
center of gravity
Total moment of inertia
for all LDs
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will allow rejection of those plans which are inferior to others in both cate-
gories. The plans remaining are then outlined on a map to check for contiguity,
for which the present computer program does not account, and the non-con-
tiguous ones are rejected.5 1 This entire process is then repeated using different
initial guesses. There is no rule as to when trials should be stopped, but since
additional trials can be promptly processed with high speed computers, a suffi-
cient number should be used to obtain a good cross section of alternative
districting plans.5 2
This procedure, supplemented by the manual rejection of solutions having
both higher population deviations and greater moments of inertia than other
possibilities, will eventually produce a collection of possible plans, among which
there is no formalized process for choosing. Some of these plans can probably
be rejected intuitively as being especially bad as regards one of two criteria.
Thus, the plan with the lowest moment of inertia may have a district deviating
as much as fifteen or twenty per cent from the average district population.s3
There may be a few plans which cannot be rejected on this basis, however.
Among these, a court or legislature could decide to make an ad hoc judgment
as to which is most desirable. Alternatively, it could decide beforehand to apply
-the plan having the lowest moment of inertia within some minimum population
deviation, say ten per cent.
We have applied the above computational procedure to develop districting
proposals for two of Delaware's three counties.5 Following present practice,
51. The computer program could also be modified to check for contiguity, though the
one outlined here does not do so.
52. Since the moment of inertia formula will tend to center LDs in areas of high
population densities, it is natural that one's first sets of initial guesses will correspond with
those areas. It is necessary, however, to include later sets of initial guesses which place
LD centers in other areas. In Figure 3, for example, the best districting resulted from
initial guesses different from the population centers.
53. Several population criteria have been suggested. The one used here measures the
maximum population deviation as a percentage of the mean district population. Thus, if
the mean district population in a state is 10,000 while the population of individual dis-
tricts ranges from 8,000 to 11,000, the maximum deviation is 2,000, or 20%.
A second measure of population equality is the ratio of the most populous district to
the least populous district. In the above hypothetical example, then, the most populous
district (11,000) is 1.38 times as large as the least populous district (8,000). A third
measure, the so-called Dauer-Kelsay scale, is the smallest percentage of a state's popu-
lation that could elect a majority of the legislative body in question. See Dauer & Kelsay,
Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 571 (1955).
For a more extensive discussion of various mathematical measures of population equal-
ity, see Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportioninent, 72 YA.z L.J. 90, 96-101 (1962).
54. The interest of the authors, an engineer and an operations research analyst, de-
veloped from studies on reapportionment by a Wilmington, Delaware, civic group, The
Committee of 39. The group gathered historical statistics, general information on appor-
tionment criteria in other states, and applicable census and election statistics which were
used by the court, the plaintiffs and the defendants in Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169
(D. Del. 1963). The Committee, represented by Mr. Bruce Stargatt, petitioned for recog-
nition as a friend of the court in late January, 1963. The possibility of districting via
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each county was dealt with separately, so that county lines would not be
crossed by the districting. The current number of thirty-five legislators was
maintained and apportioned among Delaware's three counties according to the
"method of equal proportions," which is now used to apportion seats in the
United States Congress among the states after each decennial census.55 Figure
3 and the following table of data illustrate the best districting solution obtained
for Sussex County using this computer procedure. 56 Sussex County is not a
good example for demonstrating this formula's tendency to center districts
around areas of high population densities, since it is predominantly rural,
containing no towns of sufficient size to create significant contrasts in popu-
lation density within the county. The EDs in this county are shown in Map A,
in Figure 3. Approximately twenty sets of initial guesses as to LD centers
were examined. The set of centers which ultimately resulted in the best dis-
tricts are shown in Map B. Map C shows the computer program's original
assignment of EDs to LDs. By using the actual centers of population of these
districts, another allocation of population was developed as shown in Map D.
This was actually the best assignment.5 7 As Map E indicates, the third trial,
based on the actual population centers of Map D's districts, was slightly worse.
The fourth trial gave no further change. Note that the county moment of
inertia was improved by seven per cent between Maps C and D.
None of the other 19 initial trials yielded better districting solutions, al-
though this does not prove that no better solution exists. In Sussex County,
the contiguous districting with the lowest moment of inertia also showed the
least population deviation. Consequently, it was not necessary to choose be-
tween several good solutions.
computer occurred to the senior author and the proposal herein was suggested and mathe-
matically developed by the junior author.
Attempts were made to district all three Delaware counties by hand using rules similar
to those which might be applied by the computer. See note 25 s'upra. When the computer
formulation was developed, both Kent and Sussex Counties were subjected to many trials
and single recommended plans established, according to the chosen principles of represen-
tation. These were far better than any hand solutions. Preliminary trials to district New
Castle County on the computer have been made, using census tracts in order to minimize
initial complexity. Further trials will be necessary to establish the best set of alternative
plans. The Delaware plaintiffs have shown interest in the possibilities of this formula,
but have not yet chosen to introduce it into the pending court case.
55. Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
302 (1952); ScWIcEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMMNT 70 (1941) (quoting from
report of a Committee of the National Academy of Sciences); Huntington, A Survey of
Methods of Apportionment in Congress, S. Doc. No. 304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
56. The unit of distance used in moment of inertia is dictated by the map scale from
which coordinates were read. Ours was scaled 0288 inches to the mile. Therefore, to con-
vert our values to a (man-miles) 2 moment of inertia, multiply by 12.1.
57. It should be pointed out that the computer-developed shape of districts is uneven
due to borders of the EDs. If a smoother shape is desired, additional factors might be
entered into the computer to penalize for deviations from a few major boundaries. This,
of course, would further limit the achievable population equality. See note 25 supra.
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FIGuR 3
EXAMPLE OF DISTRrcTzNG op SUSSEX COUNTY
A B
D
A-Location of U.S. Census Enumeration
Districts
B-Set of initial guesses for the 6 legis-
lative districts apportioned to Sussex
C-First assignment of population to legis-
lative districts based on guessed centers
Maximum Deviation: 5%
Moment of Inertia: 143,774
D-Second trial - Improved assignment
based on actual centers of first assign-
ment (X's indicate towns of over 1000
population.)
Maximum Deviation: 1%
Moment of Inertia: 133,923
E-Third trial: slightly worse results
Maximum Deviation: 2%
Moment of Inertia: 133,992
(Fourth trial-no further change)
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DATA Fop FIGURE 3
Original
Guessed
Centers Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
LD #1
X* 4.94" 4.58" 4.84" 4.84"
Y 7.28 8.08 8.20 8.20
Population 12,542 12,323 12,323
LD #2
X 2.06 1.73 1.83 1.90
Y 4.62 4.93 5.05 5.08
Population 11,894 12,276 12,123
LD #3
X 8.38 8.42 8.54 8.54
Y 6.75 6.17 6.04 6.04
Population 12,359 12,131 12,131
LD #4
X 9.62 8.52 8.52 8.52
Y 2.62 1.93 1.93 1.93
Population 12,053 12,053 12,053
LD #5
X 6.31 5.41 5.29 5.29
Y 3.75 3.88 3.83 3.83
Population 12,734 12,070 12,070
LD #6
X Z59 2.41 2.38 2.31
Y 2.41 2.11 2.22 2.22
Population 11,613 12,342 12,495
County Moment of Inertia 143,773.8 133,923.4 133,992.2
Total Population 73,195 73,195 73,195
Avg. 12,199
Highest 12,734 +4% 12,342 +1% 12,495 +2%
Lowest 11,613 -5% 12,053 -1% 12,053 -1%
*X is E-W map coordinates in inches. (Map scale: 0.288 inches to the mile.)
Y is N-S map coordinates in inches.
CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an objective, mathematically-based procedure for
districting which produces contiguous districts nearly equal in population and
more "compact" than other present methods can provide. It utilizes existing
computer programming techniques to locate a given number of districts within
a given area, by combining smaller areas of known population in accordance
with selected principles of representation. Two of these, population and con-
tiguity, are self-explanatory and measurable. In addition, the procedure recom-
mended in this paper introduces a quantitative measure of compactness which
tends to minimize perimeter and locate districts around population centers. By
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greatly reducing the number of choices that must be made, introduction of this
third criteria assists the development of an impartial districting procedure. The
proposed computer procedure will be of considerable usefulness to courts
desiring to avoid partisan pressures and criticism when it must redistrict a
state. Legislatures could also use it to avoid many compromises and delays.
With the use of high-speed computers, good districting solutions may presently
be calculated and chances for arithmetic error minimized.
The procedure as here reported is still in a state of development. The sug-
gested program could be modified to accommodate principles in addition to
contiguity, equal population, and compactness, if so desired. It can also be
adapted to other problem situations, such as that of school districting in grow-
ing communities. 58 With sufficient effort, the computer program can probably
be improved to produce "best" solutions which are not dependent on trial
guesses as to LD population centers. Such a unique solution would have the
least possible moment of inertia, given the prior assumptions. It might be use-
ful in developing constitutional standards for apportioning and districting,
although in itself it would not comprise a standard. Standards might be
developed by first establishing certain principles of representation, among them
compactness, which must be contained in any apportionment and districting,
and then determining the constitutionally acceptable deviations from a quan-
titative norm for each principle. A "best" compactness solution could serve as
a quantitative norm for the compactness principle. To make such standards a
realistic alternative, we are working to create a computer program giving a
"best" solution.59 We urge others to do so as well. In the interim, the current
proposal permits creation of superior districting proposals and a sound basis
for comparison among these or other existing or proposed apportionment and
districting plans.
58. The warehousing program, see note 47 supra, is particularly well adapted to add-
ig a single warehouse (school) to an existing pattern, and determining orders (children)
to be served from each location.
59. The authors have already formulated this particular problem statement mathe-
matically as an integer programming problem. While the practical districting problem so
formulated cannot now be solved, there is every reason to believe that efficient computer
programs will be available to do so within one or two years.
For approaches to solving the analogous integer programming problem (the warehouse
location problem) see Kuehn & Hamburger, A HeurLstic Program for Locating Ware-
houses, 9 MANAGEMENT SciENcE 643 (1963); BALiNSKY & MILLS, A WAREHOUSE PROB-
LEM (1960) ; Baumol & Wolfe, A Warehouse Location Problem, 6 OPERATioNs REsEARcH
252 (1958); GoORy, AN ALGORITHM FOR INTEGER SOLUTIONS TO LINEAR PROBLEMS
(1958).
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